Question Description
- 1)Background:
- 2)Policy evaluation.
In this section, draw on Statistics Canadas public tables to cover the following:
Who are the top 1%?
- Top income cut-off, average income, share of income from labour & how much tax they pay
- Sex and age
- Province/Location
Compared to the bottom 50th percentile of tax filers, how has the income share and effective tax rate of the top 1% evolved over the data period?
By province, how has the income share and effective tax rate of the province-specific top 1% evolved over time?
Consider the following proposal to increase the top marginal tax rate on the top (province-specific) 1%:
Cover the following issues (by province) with this proposal (Assume a constant ETI of 0.664):
- What is the net revenue effect (by province) of this proposal? Comment on any noticeable provincial differences.
- How much of the mechanical revenue gain disappears because of a behavioural effect?
- What are the revenue and mechanical effects per tax filer?
- Why is the elasticity of taxable income important?
- What might explain these differences
- Think about skewness & revenue gain share of the mechanical effect
- What is the marginal cost of public funds?
- Explain and calculate the optimal province-specific top 1% marginal tax rate. How far off is it from the fictitious +5 marginal tax rate?
- Assuming no income shifting, what is the size of the vertical fiscal externality?
- What are the progressivity implications of this proposal?